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ARGUMENT

Deutsch's opposition is perhaps most notable for what it ignores:
1.

His failure to preserve argument ignores the record evidence, including his

specific admission that Federated preserved the same issue it now raises on appeal.
2.
Vil

His argument that Federated seeks to "overturn 100 years of precedent"

ignores the settled law in the introductory phrases of Section 188 of the Restatement of
Conflicts, the statement of the "place of performance" rule in Pingree, and the Borrowing
Statute.
3.

And finally, his opposition completely ignores, let alone addresses, the

well-settled rule at the heart of this appeal expressed in Federated's opening brief that: "A
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."
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Because Deutsch fails to challenge Federated' s central argument, and because of
what he ignores in his opposition, this Court should grant Federated's appeal, reverse the

®

trial court's ruling including its award of Deutsch's attorney fees, and remand. This Court
should also award Federated its attorney fees both below and on appeal.

A.

Because Federated properly preserved the issue it has raised on appeal, and
Deutsch acknowledged as much below, this Court should reject Deutsch's
contrary argument here.
In his opposition, Deutsch repeatedly asserts 1 that Federated failed to preserve and

"never once" argued and "failed to even mention . . . in any fashion" below that the
Borrowing Statute does not apply because the parties' choice of law agreement means its

CiliJ

breach of contract claim arose in Utah. Opp. Br. at 11-15.
This Court has held that to preserve an issue 2 for appeal, a party must ( 1)
specifically raise it, (2) in a timely fashion, (3) with supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority. State v. Gailey, 2015 UT App 249 ,I 5, 360 P.3d 805 (citing Pratt v. Nelson,
2007 UT 41, ,I 15, 164 P.3d 366).
Federated complied with these requirements by specifically raising the issue in its
timely-filed opposition memorandum to Deutsch's motion for summary judgment with
~

supporting evidence and relevant legal authority. Indeed, Deutsch acknowledged below

1

Deutsch made such assertions no less than ten times. Opp. Br. at 6-8, 11-15.
While Utah appellate courts use the words "issue," "claim," "argument," and "matter"
almost interchangeably when discussing the preservation rule (Patterson v. Patterson,
2011 UT 68, ,r 14, 266 P.3d 828), the Utah Supreme Court has taught, "Issues must be
preserved, not arguments for or against a particular ruling on an issue raised below."
Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63 ,r 45, 323 P .3d 998 (emphasis in original). "An issue is
preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a way that the
court has an opportunity to rule on [it]." Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,Il2.
2

2
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Cw

what he now denies \0i>

that Federated made the same argument below that it makes here.

See State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7, ,r 9, 345 P.3d 1141 (failure to preserve argument is without

merit where appellant's "argument on appeal is the same argument he made to the trial
court"). Thus, Deutsch's current argument that Federated did not preserve the issue it
raised on appeal is without merit.

1. In his reply memorandum below, Deutsch acknowledged Federated raised
the same issue it is arguing on appeal. Contrary to his repeated arguments here,
Deutsch acknowledged that Federated asserted in opposition to his motion for summary
~

judgment that the Borrowing Statute did not apply because the parties' contract "states
otherwise" under Pingree, and that the "cause of action for non-payment must have arose
[sic] in Utah." Deutsch Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment ("Deutsch
Reply Memorandum") at 11

,r 6,

R. 208. In other words, Deutsch acknowledged below

that he understood Federated's argument to be what it is arguing now. Cf id. with
Federated's Opening Brief ("Opening Br.") at 8-14.
Because of his admission, corroborated by the record, this Court should reject
Deutsch's contrary argument here.

2. A review of the record establishes that Federated preserved the issue it has
raised on appeal. In its timely-filed Opposition memorandum below (R. 129-191):
a. Federated quoted the choice of law and forum selection provisions which appear in the same paragraph of the parties' Agreement. In its opposition to
Deutsch's motion for summary judgment below, Federated quoted the "CONTROLLING
LAW AND JURISDICTION" provision of the parties' Agreement:
3
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This agreement shall be governed solely by and interpreted entirely in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah ... regardless of where you reside
or where the business is located. . . . YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH AND
AGREE THAT ANY LAWSUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT MUST
BE BROUGHT ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN UTAH, REGARDLESS OF
WHO FILES THE SUITS ....

®

Advanta Business Card Agreement if 31 (all-caps in the original; italic emphasis added),
R. 137 (quoting R. 153); cf. Deutsch Reply Memorandum at 7 iJ I 0, R. 204; Trial court's
oral ruling, R. 750-751.

b. Federated specifically argued that "The Forum-Selection Clause of the
Agreement Governs in This Case." R. 139. As noted above, the Forum-Selection

~

Clause contains the parties' choice of law agreement, namely: that their Agreement "shall

be governed solely by ... the laws of the State of Utah." Advanta Business Card
Agreement

iJ

31 (emphasis added), R. 137 (quoting R. 153); cf. Deutsch Reply

Memorandum at 7 iJ 10, R. 204; Trial court's oral ruling, R. 750-751.

c. Federated specifically referred to the parties' choice of law provision:

~

"[T]he parties agreed that Utah substantive law applied to govern the Agreement."
R. 143, 144 (emphasis added).
~

d. Federated quoted the Borrowing Statute in full. R. 141, n. l:

A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not
actionable in the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not be
pursued in this state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state
who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-103 (emphasis added).

4
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e. Federated argued that, "In this case, the Borrowing Statute does not apply"
and that "the Borrowing Statute should not be construed to displace the parties'
contractual rights." R. 141, 144. Given the facts here (that the exception after "unless"
does not apply) 3, the only way the Borrowing Statute would not apply is if Federated's
breach of contract claim did not "arise[] in another jurisdiction" but "arose" in Utah. See
R. 421

,r,r

1, 3, 6, and 7; R. 423

,r

1. Thus, Federated argued below that its breach of

contract claim arose in Utah. Indeed, as noted above, Deutsch acknowledged as much.
Deutsch Reply Memorandum at 11

,r 6, R. 208 (Federated argued that its "cause of action

for non-payment must have arose [sic] in Utah").

f. Quoting this Court's opinion in the Pingree case, Federated argued: "The
court stated that '[u]nless the contract states otherwise, a cause of action for a breach
of contract generally arises where the contract is to be performed." ... (emphasis
added) ... As discussed above, by its plain language, the Borrowing Statute does not
i.:;J)

apply if the parties agree to a particular forum and the procedural law . ... In this
case, the Agreement states otherwise." R. 145 (italics in original), quoting Financial
Bancorp v. Pingree and Dahle, 880 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah App. 1994). Thus, Federated

argued below that because the parties' Agreement "stated otherwise," its breach of
contract claim arose in Utah. Cf Deutsch Reply Memorandum at 11

,r 6, R. 208.

Because Federated specifically raised the issue of whether the Borrowing Statute
applied, it preserved the legal issue of whether, as a threshold matter, its breach of
vib
3

Cf Opp. Br. at 18. n.5.
5
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contract claim arose in Utah. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68

~

20, 266 P.3d 828

("whether and how [a statute] applies ... can be resolved purely as a matter oflaw").

~

g. Federated concluded, "The parties agreed to be bound by Utah substantive
law and by Utah's procedural law." R. 147. In other words, Federated argued that
because the parties agreed to be bound by Utah's substantive law (via their choice of law
agreement), the case "arose" in Utah under Utah law, not Pennsylvania law so that the
Borrowing Statute did not apply; and that because the parties agreed to be bound by
Utah's procedural law (via their forum selection agreement), Utah's six-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract applied. Id.
In sum, Federated specifically and timely argued that the "Controlling Law and
Jurisdiction" paragraph of the parties' Agreement meant Federated's breach of contract
claim "arose" in Utah and under Utah law (not in Pennsylvania), so that the Borrowing
Statute did not apply. Federated supported its argument by quoting the paragraph from
the parties' Agreement containing both the choice of law and forum selection provisions,
and by quoting this Court's opinion in Pingree for the proposition that because their
contract "stated otherwise," their case "arose" in Utah not in Pennsylvania. Finally,
Federated quoted the Borrowing Statute and argued that it does not apply here. R. 137147. It therefore supported the issue it raised with supporting evidence and relevant legal
authority. Gailey, 2015 UT App 24915, citing Pratt, 2007 UT 41, ~ 15.
Accordingly, because Federated specifically raised the issue of whether the
Borrowing Statute applies, and whether its breach of contract cause of action arose in

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

([j

Utah, Deutsch's argument that Federated failed to preserve this issue for appeal 1s
without merit.

3. At oral argument below, Federated argued that the Borrowing Statute did
not apply because, by contract, the case arose in Utah:

~

The borrowing statute, as Mr. Perry explained, 78B-2-103, contains two prongs,
really. Cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not
actionable in the other jurisdiction by reason of lapse of time. Again, those two
things have to be there for the borrowing statute to
apply....
Based on the contract this cause of action is not brought in Pennsylvania
because it can't be by contract. And that's what the Pingree case says. If the
contract states otherwise, then you use that. In this case it does state otherwise. It
states any lawsuit brought on any of these matters must be brought in Utah, either
federal or state courts, as we know what the contract says. That's why we've -Federated has brought the cases in Utah and has applied the six-year statute,
written contract statute of limitations, because the borrowing statute simply legally
doesn't apply . ...
A cause of action or a case could not have been brought in Pennsylvania. It had to
be brought in Utah based on the agreement of the parties. And based on that we
think the six-year statute should apply, your Honor.
R. 745-757 (emphasis). Again, because Federated specifically raised the issue of whether
the Borrowing Statute applies, and whether its breach of contract cause of action arose in
Utah, Deutsch's argument that Federated failed to preserve this issue for appeal is
without merit.

4. Contrary to Deutsch's argument, the Libby opinion itself establishes that
Federated did not raise in Libby the issue it raises here. In further support of his
"failure to preserve" argument, Deutsch argues that Federated's opposition memorandum
below was "virtually identical" to its briefs in Libby and Chapa, purportedly showing

7
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~

"that it never intended to raise additional arguments in this appeal that it did not make in

Libby and Chapa." Opp. Br. at 13; see also Id. at 11-15.
Besides ignoring his own admission, corroborated by the record evidence, that
Federated argued below that the Borrowing Statute does not apply because its breach of
contract claim "arose" in Utah, Deutsch's argument here ignores the key distinction
between Libby and this case:
• In Libby, Federated conceded at oral argument that its cause of action in that
case "arose in Pennsylvania." 4
• Here, Federated has argued consistently that its case against Deutsch "arose" in

~

Utah and that the Borrowing Statute does not apply. 5
As noted, Deutsch conceded below that this was the substance of Federated's
argument. The fact that he may disagree with this argument is insufficient support for
Deutsch's assertion that Federated failed to preserve this issue.
In sum, because Federated specifically raised with supporting evidence and legal
authority the same issue below it has raised on appeal, because Deutsch acknowledged as
much in his reply memorandum below, and because Federated's concession in Libby that
its cause of action "arose in Pennsylvania" distinguishes Libby from this case, Deutsch's
"failure to preserve" argument is without merit.
B.

Because Federated preserved the issue it appeals, neither plain error nor
invited error applies here.

~

4

5

Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, ,r,r 10, 19.
See argument section A. above.
8
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Gj

Deutsch argues that, although Federated may argue plain error here, it does not
~

apply. Opp. Br. at 15-16. Because, as shown above, Federated preserved the issue it
appeals, Federated agrees that plain error does not apply.
Deutsch further argues that invited error should preclude review. Id. Because
Deutsch fails to identify where Federated "intentionally misle[ d] the trial court so as to
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal" (Opp. Br. at 17, quoting Pratt v. Nelson,

l.(rj

2007 UT 41, 1 17), this argument is without support. Deutsch's unsupported invited error
argument is thus completely without merit.

C.

Because his argument ignores the well-settled law cited by Federated,
Deutsch's assertion that Federated is asking this Court to "upset over 100
years of precedent" is without merit.
Deutsch argues that Federated is asking this Court to overrule the "place of

performance" test in breach of contract cases and "over 100 years of precedent." Opp. Br.
at 17-24. Deutsch's position seems to be that the place of performance rule always
vJ

applies in any breach of contract case. Id. Ironically, that position is contrary to statute
and case law and only serves to highlight the introductory language in the well-settled
law that Deutsch's argument ignores.
1. The introductory phrase of Section 188 of the Restatement of Conflicts

(Second) says: "In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties." The
section goes on to say that, in the absence of such an agreement, the "most significant
relationship" test applies. American National Fire Insurance v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 927 P .2d 186, 188, 190 (Utah 1996), quoting with approval Restatement of
Conflicts (Second) ("Restatement of Conflicts") § 188 (quoted in Federated's Opening
9
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(j

Brief at 9). While the Restatement lists several "contacts to be taken into account ... to
determine the law applicable to an issue," Utah case law has generally identified the
"place of performance" as "the most significant relationship." Id.; Pingree, 880 P.2d at
17 (see quotation and argument in the next subsection).
No one disputes that there was "an effective choice of law by the parties" here.
The parties expressly agreed:
This agreement shall be governed solely by and interpreted entirely in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah ... regardless of where you reside or
where the business is located.
Advanta Business Card Agreement

1 31,

R. 137 (quoting R. 153); cf Deutsch Reply

Memorandum at 71 10, R. 204; Trial court's oral ruling, R. 750-751.
Thus, because there was an effective choice of law here, pursuant to the
Restatement of Conflicts neither the "most significant relationship" nor "place of
performance" test applies. Deutsch ignores the introductory phrase in the Restatement
because, by his reasoning, the "place of performance" test should apparently always
apply in a breach of contract case. As shown above, such a position is contrary to settled
law, namely the Restatement of Conflicts, which has been adopted in Utah. American
National, 827 P.2d at 188, 190. Such a position is also contrary to this Court's opinion in
Pingree.

2. The introductory phrase in this Court's opinion in Pingree says: "Unless
the contract states otherwise ...." This phrase appears to echo Section 188 of the
Restatement of Conflicts quoted above. Since they both relate to the "most significant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

relationship" or "place of performance" test, "Unless the contract says otherwise" in
~

Pingree appears to mean "[i]n the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties."

This Court went on to say in Pingree that absent such a contractual provision, "a
cause of action for a breach of contract generally arises where the contract is to be
performed." Pingree, 880 P.2d at 17 (emphasis added). It seems notable that Pingree uses
the word "generally" regarding application of the "place of performance" test. In other
words, even where there is no effective choice of law by the parties, the "place of
performance" test does not always apply. But because there was an effective choice of
~

law by the parties here, the Court need go no further in its analysis.
In other words, where, as here, the contract does say otherwise (i.e., where there is
an effective choice of law by the parties), a breach of contract claim "arises" under the
substantive law of the state the parties have chosen to govern their case. This simple
principle, essentially ignored by Deutsch in his opposition, that "[a] suit arises under the

~

law that creates the cause of action," 6 is dispositive here. In this case, based on the
parties' express choice that Utah law govern their dispute, this breach of contract claim
arose in Utah. Thus, the Borrowing Statute does not apply.
Pingree also dealt with a contractual choice of place of performance. Opp. Br. at

27-28. But because a case "arises" under the law of the parties' choice, there is no need
for a trial court to reach or analyze either common law or contractual "place of
6

vJ

Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed.
987 (1916) (Holmes, J.). The only time Deutsch addresses this principle in his opposition
is to note that it was applied in a patent case in a dispute about whether federal question
or state law applied. But he provides no support for his argument that it should not be
applied here. Opp. Br. at 30-31.
11
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performance." Based on section 188 of the Restatement and Pingree, the parties' choice
of law is determinative as to where their case "arose."
Thus, far from "overruling 100 years of precedent," the rule in Section 188 and
Pingree (that the parties' contract pre-empts the general "place of performance" rule in a
breach of contract case), is, as Deutsch conceded, "the current state of the law in Utah."
Opp. Br. at 18 n.6 (citing Justice Lee's concurring opinion in Libby at iJ37); Pingree, 880
P.2d at 17. 7

3. The introductory phrase in the Borrowing Statute says it applies to: "[ a]
cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction ...." Utah Code Ann. iJ 78B-2-103
(emphasis added). In other words, the Borrowing Statute does not apply to a cause of
action which arises in Utah.
What conclusion should this Court reach from taking together the three
introductory phrases in the settled law quoted above (and which Deutsch's argument
ignores)? That, because of the parties' express contractual choice of law, Federated's
breach of contract cause of action "arose" in Utah, so the Borrowing Statute does not
apply here and Utah's six-year statute of limitations does.

7

Deutsch's concession on this point is significant because he initially misstated the
current rule in his opposition (by omitting the introductory phrase, "Unless the contract
states otherwise"). Citing four cases from 1898 through 1908, Deutsch wrote: "A cause of
action for breach of contract arises in the state in which the parties determine the
performance [sic] was to be performed." Opp. Br. at 18. As noted, this Court decided
Pingree in 1994, and Justice Lee acknowledged in September 2016 that the rule in
Pingree, which includes the introductory phrase "Unless the contract states otherwise," is
the "current state of the law in Utah." Libby, 2016 UT 41, if 37.
12
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Thus, far from "overruling 100 years of precedent," settled law supports
Federated's arguments here and Deutsch's contrary argument is unsupported.

D.
v;

Because Federated's arguments here were not before the Utah Supreme
Court in Libby, because Deutsch apparently misapprehends the rule in
Pingree, and because Federated's position finds support in settled law, there
is no need to overturn anything to grant Federated's appeal.
Deutsch argues that the Utah Supreme Court "was not 'clearly convinced' that the

subject rule [in Pingree] should be overturned and presented no compelling reason for
doing so." Opp. Br. at 17-20. As shown above, Federated is not asking to overturn

Pingree. Nothing in Federated' s arguments here requires overturning Pingree. Indeed,
applying the conditional phrase Deutsch apparently ignores in Pingree is the very reason
Federated should prevail in this appeal.
Deutsch further argues that neither the majority nor the concurring opinion in

Libby "discuss[ ed] the issue" Federated has raised in this appeal. Id. at 20. This argument
misses the point because Federated conceded in Libby that its claim in that case arose in

Pennsylvania, not Utah. Thus, nothing in Federated's arguments here requires
overturning Libby because the Utah supreme court never considered the issue and
arguments Federated makes here.
Finally, Deutsch's argument about Justice Lee's "speculation" in Libby (Id. at 2426) has no bearing on the issues here. This Court need only follow Section 188 in the
Restatement of Conflicts, Pingree, and the Borrowing Statute to conclude that, based on
the parties' effective choice of law, this case arose in Utah, so the Borrowing Statute does
~

not apply and Utah's six-year statute of limitations does.

13
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E.

Deutsch's characterization of the holding in Pingree is consistent with
Federated's position.
Deutsch asserts that Federated "completely misstates the holding in Pingree."

Opp. Br. at 27; see also id. at 26-28. On the contrary, Federated quoted verbatim the
entire holding in Pingree in its opening brief, namely, "Unless the contract states
otherwise, a cause of action for a breach of contract generally arises where the contract is
to be performed." Federated's Opening Brief at 9, quoting Pingree, 880 P.2d at 17.
Ironically, Deutsch's characterization of this holding is consistent with Federated's
position. Deutsch says Pingree stands for the proposition that "unless the contract
chooses a jurisdiction other than where it is to be performed as the place where the cause
of action arises, the cause of action will arise where it is to be performed." Opp. Br. at
26. 8
That is precisely Federated's position here: that the parties' choice of law in their
contract "chooses a jurisdiction other than where it is to be performed as the place where
the cause of action arises." Id. Deutsch's characterization is thus consistent with
8

Notwithstanding this apparent concession, Deutsch nevertheless seems to insist that
"Unless the contract says otherwise" actually means, "unless the contract says otherwise
as to place ofperformance." See Opp. Br. at 28. But that would make the rest of the
holding nonsensical: "Unless the contract says otherwise [(Deutsch's interpolation:) "as
to place of performance"], a cause of action for breach of contract generally arises where
the contract is to be performed." A reasonable reading supports Federated's position:
"Unless the contract says otherwise [about where a breach of contract claim arises], a
cause of action for breach of contract generally arises where the contract is to be
performed. Thus, the court in Pingree held that parties can pre-empt the place of
performance test if"the[ir] contract says otherwise." Deutsch's contrary position, that the
place of performance test somehow preempts the parties' choice of law (see, e.g., Opp.
Br. at 26-31 ), finds no support in Pingree - or Section 188 of the Restatement, or the
other authorities Federated has cited. Indeed, it is directly contrary to those authorities.
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Federated's reading of Pingree and with Section 188 of the Restatement, namely: that
@

the parties' choice of law preempts place of performance. Deutsch's characterization is
also consistent with the principle that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause
of action."
In sum, contrary to Deutsch's subsequent arguments (Opp. Br. at 26-31),
Federated's position is supported by Deutsch's own characterization of the holding in

({j

Pingree and other well-settled authorities.

F.

Deutsch's policy arguments are misplaced because they ignore the settled law
supporting Federated's position.
In propounding his policy arguments (Opp. Br. at 20-24), Deutsch continues to

ignore the settled law cited above and in Federated's Opening Brief. As Federated noted
in the Opening Brief, "[p]olicy considerations support the result here": the parties should
be free to contract and identify by their choice of law where a dispute between them
arises, and application of this simple rule provides for judicial economy and is simple to
apply in connection with the Borrowing Statute. Opening Br. at 15-18.
Thus the settled law is dispositive, policy considerations are secondary, and,
according to the Restatement, those policy factors apply primarily when the most
significant relationship (or in Utah, the place of performance test) is at issue. See

American National Fire Insurance, 927 P.2d at 189, and Restatement of Conflicts
(Second), § 6.
Since the place of performance test is not at issue here because it was preempted
by the parties' choice of law, such policy considerations merely support why the rule is
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settled law, namely "the protection of justified expectations [by the parties to
enforcement of the terms of their contract]," "the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law [e.g., contract law and the freedom to contract], "certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result," and "ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied [meaning, judicial economy]." Id.

1. Freedom to contract. Deutsch gives lip service to parties' freedom to contract.
Opp. Br. at 20-22. But his arguments seem to minimize the consequences of his
agreement to repay the amounts advanced to him, and the impact of his choice of law.
Contrary to his assertions, place of performance does not preempt his choice of law. It is

CiillJ

the other way around. As shown above, his choice of law preempts place of performance.
2. Judicial economy. Deutsch seems to underestimate the judicial chore of
~

determining the place of performance in a digital world. Is it where he initiated an
electronic payment in Texas? Or where his bank (which may have been in another state)
actually executed and disbursed the funds? Or where the funds were ultimately received
by Advanta bank (in this case, in Utah)?
In connection with an express choice of law by the parties, the simple rule that "[a]
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action" eliminates any further analysis.
It lets the parties decide (see "Freedom to contract").
3. Simplicity. Deutsch's repeated emphasis on the distinction between choice of

law (substantive law) and choice of forum (procedural law, including statutes of
limitation) is misplaced. Opp. Br. at 21-27, 30-31. Federated understands and accepts the
distinction.
16
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Federated' s argument is not that procedural law of the chosen forum should not
~

apply, it is that the choice of law (substantive law) provides the answer to the threshold
question about where a case "arises." And answering that question is dispositive about

~

whether the Borrowing Statute applies. For example, if the choice of law is Utah, Utah
substantive law governs the dispute, and therefore the cases "arises" under Utah law.
Thus, because the "cause of action [did not arise] in another jurisdiction," the Borrowing
Statute does not apply. Since the parties here also chose Utah as the forum, Utah's statute
of limitations for breach of a written contract (six years) applies.
In sum, Justice Holme's expression of the rule that "[a] suit arises under the law
that creates the cause of action" is supported by the settled law in the Restatement,
Pingree, and the Borrowing Statute. Policies favoring parties' freedom to contract,

judicial economy, and simplicity support the rule that the parties' own choice of law
governs where a breach of their agreement arises.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in the opening brief, Federated
respectfully requests reversal of summary judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of May, 2017.

Isl Barnard N. Madsen

Barnard N. Madsen
Aaron P. Dodd
Peter Reichman
Attorneys for Appellant
Capital Corp.
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